Planning seeks to shape socio-spatial outcomes, but is also, by nature, future-oriented. Yet, planning theory and practice have paid relatively little attention to ongoing debates about changing social relations to time. Building on a wide range of disciplines, we review the multiple temporalities through which lives are lived, the modern imposition of clock time, postmodern acceleration phenomena in the Anthropocene, as well as their implications for planningÕs relationship to the past, present and future, and for planning theory. We discuss how thinking more and differently about time might challenge and improve planning by helping theory do better justice to the complexity of practice. We conclude by outlining eight propositions for rethinking planningÕs relationship to time.
it offers are difficult to perceive in the world around us without a determined effort to cultivate particular ways of seeing.
The contemporary present is, however, a key moment in which to reconsider how we think about time and the possibilities it enables (and disables) for planning practice. In late capitalist societies, relationships to time and space are undergoing profound change (Harvey 1990; ). The qualitative intensification of social acceleration and the technologically-driven disruption of many established social practices are seemingly undermining human capacity to contain risks or influence how the world is changing. The idea that we are living in a new geological era, the Anthropocene (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000) , characterized by catastrophic human impacts on the planet, profoundly unsettles the timescales on which we think and act. We now live in parallel timeframes, or ÔshadowtimesÕ where we experience everyday time while also being acutely conscious of our position and role in ongoing changes at ÒdeeperÓ, i.e. geological, time scales (Beilin and Suryanarayanan 2016) . The existential threats posed by impending ecological crises also generate a profound sense of urgency. Time seems to be running out but also reversing as innumerable threats stream back towards the present from futures we have already damaged and seem incapable of mending (Latour 2013; Braun 2015) . We are locked-in to unsustainable patterns of development that generate potentially fatal path-dependencies (Urry 2016) . At the same time, intensifying processes of space-time compression have accelerated the pace of life, outstripping human capacities to shape and guide change (Rosa 2009; Harvey 1990) . If the present is a Òswitching pointÓ where we seek to influence past trajectories as they extend into possible futures (Luhmann 1976) , our contemporary future imaginary is marked by eschatological thought, projecting a Ònew catastrophismÓ pessimistic about our collective capacity to shape the future (Urry 2016) .
The implications of such meta-narratives for planning theory and practice are significant. As Connell (2009) notes, urban planning is sometimes presented as a timeless activity, seamlessly linking contemporary practices to ancient city-building processes. However, ideas of planning are always shaped and enacted as part of historically variable regimes, influenced by social imaginaries that reflect and condition our understanding of the possibility of controlling time and space. Theoretical accounts regularly trace planning ideas to roots in enlightenment thought and the belief that rational thinking can be used to shape progressively better futures (Healey 1997; Friedmann 1987) . Debates about the implications of post-modernity for planning thought, meanwhile, raise profound questions about what remains of planning when fundamental tenets of societiesÕ relationship to time, especially belief in progress, are undermined (Campbell 2005 ). Yet, debates about changing paradigms of planning thought can obscure how changing relations to time operate as an ongoing dimension of the politics of possibility for re-shaping planning ideas and practices within diverse and changing spatiotemporal regimes. For example, recent problematizations of the time planning processes take, whether in bureaucratic-technical or participatory-democratic terms, raise profound challenges for both theory and practice (e.g., Abram 2014) . In this context, the starting point for this paper is that planning theoryÕs relative silence about the nature of time and its relations to planning and urban life is itself increasingly problematic.
Instead of simply contrasting utopian, progress-oriented planning with the condition of postmodernity, we join others who have recently begun to explore what developing concern for Òcritical temporalitiesÓ (Bastian 2014 ) might mean for planning theory and practice (Livingstone and Matthews 2015; Raco et al. 2018; Degen 2018) . Planning is about choices, the possibilities of change, and normatively the Òtransition over time from current states to desired onesÓ (Abram and Weszkalnys 2011, 4) . However, this temporal dimension is not sufficient to solidly anchor a discussion of planning and time 2 . Planning practices necessarily draw upon, generate and seek to reshape various processes unfolding across a range of temporalities (Abram 2014) . This involves the application of various techniques, methods and regulations to tame complexity, select, envision and implement a chosen future (or possible futures). In practice, such techniques are pragmatically blended with the necessity of muddling through, arguing, collaborating, negotiating, estimating and improvising in the face of wicked problems, uneven power relations and disagreement about how they should be tackled (Hoch 1984; Laws and Forester 2015) .
To capture these multiple facets of planningÕs relations to time, we start from FriedmannÕs (1987) definition of planning as the application of knowledge to action. We conceive of planning broadly, as the act of applying a variety of knowledge types to actions that seek to shape the future course of events over changing timeframes, but always from the standpoint of a present informed by the past.
This entails acting in and on a complex of interacting forces, tendencies and trajectories of possibility, requiring a sensitive grasp of the various temporalities at work in shaping change.
Reviewing the implications for planning of the pervasive sense that social relations to time have become a problem enables us to explore how these temporal dimensions of planning and urban change might be rethought, and what the implications might be for planning with a heightened sensitivity towards time. Following Walter BenjaminÕs critique of Hegelian historicism, teleologies of progress and homogenous time, we normatively seek to understand how possibilities for change might be opened up by thinking about the present as ÒJetztzeitÓ (the time of now), a time when collective action has the potential to "explodeÓ out of the continuum of history, generating new possibilities (Benjamin [1940] , 1974 XVI).
The paper makes several key contributions to planning thought and practice. We highlight how changing conceptualizations of time underlie the shift from pre-modernity to modernity to postmodernity, and the very possibility Ðand difficulty-of planning. Drawing on insights from diverse disciplines, we also propose ways to rethink multiple temporalities as rich opportunities for planning intervention.
We start with an overview of understandings of social time, from the nature of ÔmodernÕ time to an exploration of how various accounts of post-modernity posit fundamental changes in social relations to time. Second, we turn to reflections on time in scientific and philosophical thought in search of ways to strengthen or reimagine planningÕs relationship to time by understanding the creative possibilities opened up by re-envisioning temporalities and time-space relations. Thirdly, we delve more concretely into the quandaries that time presents for planning theory and practice, emphasizing how both modern and postmodern time horizons challenge the future orientation of planning and discussing planningÕs relations to the past, present and future. Finally, we propose a set of eight propositions that can better integrate plural and changing temporalities in planning thought and practice.
A. On the Evolution of Time
Time is a composite notion that defies definition. It is ÒmellifluousÓ and multidimensional (Thrift 1977, 92) . It is a scarce resource and an unescapable constraint. It is made up of duration, change, sequence, a continuum of past, present and future, trajectory, evolution, memory and meaning, anticipations and goals, it is cultural, linguistic, social, normative, a threat and a necessity (Thrift 1977) . Nearly all fields of philosophical and scientific inquiry therefore address time as a fundamental feature of human experience. A comprehensive review of its treatment across disciplines is therefore beyond the scope of this paper. Rather than seeking to define time, we start by exploring key debates about changing social understandings of time before going on to selectively consider some significant developments in thinking about time across a range of other disciplines.
Modern clock time (Is it cuckoo?)
Sociological theory and research has long recognized how treatments of time and understandings of self, social origins and norms co-emerge within every culture (Adam and Groves 2011 evolutionary futureÓ (Mead 1899; Strauss 1991, 416) . MeadÕs evolutionary future opens the possibility of applying reason and knowledge to propose Òan order which is more adequate than the order which has been thereÓ (Mead 1938, 663 )-i.e., to plan. He also proposes that this evolution can enlarge Òthe scope of moral social consciousness (É) expanding universes of discourseÓ and increase Òsocial differentiation, complexity and integrationÓ (Strauss 1991,418) . The inauguration of modern time thus created the conditions of possibility for planning: a means of applying reason to shape an open future (Connell 2009 ).
Modern time is lived by the clock which powerfully conditions our common-sense understanding of time. Abstract clock time is disconnected from natural cycles or human biology and has become essential for fine-grained social coordination and the standardization of activities across space. The power of clock-time obscures the extent to which it is a social construction:
Éclocks not only include time as a measure, they also measure time. It is this dual function of clock time that requires some attention since the two are qualitatively different. The invariant measure is a human abstraction whilst that which is being measured is a physical, natural phenomenon whose very essence is repetition with variation. (Adam 1990, 53) In the West, clocks became common in the mid-14th century on churches and in Christian monasteries, imposing the timing of devotional services. These clocks later assumed increasing importance for coordinating market-trading hours. Today, most of the world lives by clock time.
Time is standardized into zones, and everywhere daily life is disconnected (desynchronized) from natural cycles. After churches, clocks were added to schools, factories, banks, train stations, gaining in preeminence in the urban landscape. By the 19th century, the bourgeois ideal was to be Òregular as clockwork.Ó Throughout the 19th century, as clocks and watches became affordable, their wide diffusion became Òessential to a well-articulated system of transportation and productionÓ (Mumford 1934 (Mumford , 2010 .
In Technics and Civilization, Mumford sized the essential contribution of the clock to western culture and industrialization. The punchclock transformed time into an instrument of class domination over production and social behaviors. Deeper still, the clock became a Òsecond nature,Ó with a:
pervasive and strict (effect): it presides over the day from the hour of rising to the hour of rest. (É) Abstract time became the new medium of existence. Organic functionsÉ regulated by it: one ate not upon feeling hungry but when prompted by the clock; one slept not when one was tired but when the clock sanctioned it. A generalized time-consciousness accompanied the wider use of clocks Ð dissociating time from organic sequences. (Mumford 1934 (Mumford , 2010 Clocks are central to the development and intensification of capitalism, where time literally becomes money, treated as a commodity that can be lost, saved, sold and given. Intensifying working time and accelerating the circuits of capital are central factors of productivity and profit (Thrift 1977) . The imposition of time-discipline on a reluctant proletariat through strict factory working hours is understood as a key battle in the industrial revolution and establishment of capitalist social relations (Thompson 1967) . Clock time is therefore a precondition for industrial and capitalist development, and perhaps the greatest influence driving modernity (Mumford argues that the clock is a more powerful driver of modernity than the steam engine).
Within the industrial and post-industrial age, imposed times (work/school schedules, curfews) are simultaneously central to economic and social production and techniques of domination. Sociologists have long noted how time disciplines social life. Temporal habitus (or norms) are fully internalized forms of self-restraint that are both pervasive and implacable (Tabboni 2001) . Norbert Elias went as far as to argue that the level of ÒcivilizationÓ (a term consistent with MeadÕs notion of social evolution) reflects the extent to which social actors are able and willing to acculturate and submit to an imposed, although invisible, time discipline. Rejecting clock time thus becomes a potentially revolutionary act: ÒRefusing to carry a watch É is one of the ways of declaring independence from conventional societyÓ (Lynch 1972, 66 
ÒLive from postmodernity!Ó Living in real time
Modern time is homogeneous and linear, and modernity increased speed in information and communication dramatically, compressing time and duration, thus extending and globalizing the present Ðto the detriment of the past and future (Adam 2006) . The further intensification of the speed of flows, or space-time compression (Harvey 1990) , is a fundamental feature of post-modernity with profound consequences for understanding human capacities to purposively plan for the future. Marvin et al. 2016; Vanolo 2016; Giroux 2015; Hentschel 2007 ).
Independent of the risks inherent to Smart Cities development, increasingly accurate clock time enables the precise synchronization of activities in fast-paced service-oriented economies (e.g. Òjust in timeÓ supply chains). Social acceleration is driven by technologically-enabled economic change and the increasing functional specialization of society (Rosa 2009 ). These increase the pace of life and social change, generating the pervasive experience of stressful time shortages or Òtime faminesÓ (Linder 1970) Ðthere are Ònot enough hours in the dayÓ. Whilst hard to gauge, LŸbbe (2009) suggests this can be measured by the extent to which the past no longer holds true in the present, or acts as a guide to the future. In these circumstances, the present becomes ÒcontractedÓ and the horizon of experience (past) and expectation (future) no longer coincide sufficiently for people to make plans:
É adherence to a time-resistant life plan [is] incompatible with the demands of the late modern world. Thus, a conception of the good life based on long-term commitments, duration, and stability is thwarted by the fast pace of social change. (Rosa 2009,100) In response to the stress of social acceleration, some cultivate practices of deceleration, e.g., attending Òtemporal retreatsÓ with yoga, spirituality, mindfulness meditation and/or digital detox to be Òin the present.Ó Meanwhile, a mass market of ÒproductivityÓ apps sells us ways to extract more value from our precious time. This assumes we are drowning in a quagmire of fast-flowing (flying) time, losing track of the present and squandering opportunities for Òquality time.Ó Social acceleration is not, however, evenly distributed across societies and is often accompanied by parallel processes of deceleration, whether as an intentional political response to the alienation of a speeded up world (e.g.
Slow food, Slow towns movements) or as a consequence of unequal access to the motors of acceleration (Rosa 2009 ).
Acceleration dynamics have changed the key phenomenological categories of past, present and future in ways that continue to be debated. The future no longer operates as an Òopen horizon of expectationÓ into which problems, hopes and possibilities can be deferred. Instead, according to Nowotny (1996,50) , the unravelling of Enlightenment faith in progress has created an Òextended presentÓ with little prospect of escape from unsustainable trajectories:
Thus it is not just that (the) Ôfuture is not what it used to beÕÉIt is increasingly overshadowed by the problems that are opening up in the present. The future no longer offers that projection space into which all desires, hopes and fears could be projected without many inhibitions because it seemed sufficiently remote to be able to absorb everything which had no place or was not welcome in the present. The future has become more realistic (É). But this also means that it is drawing closer to the present. (É) a momentum of the present has been established which has to concentrate on itself.
For many, the contemporary experience of the present may be of an extended Òimpasse,Ó where, for example, the optimistic promises of a better future that characterized the post-war period have unraveled, leaving people stuck in conditions of precarity and marginality (Berlant 2011) . Under these circumstances, Berlant argues the persistence of optimistic attachments to a better future become ÒcruelÓ since the possibility for their realization has eroded Ð a cruelty she identifies as a dysfunction of modernity. She therefore points towards the affective dimensions of the politics of time as generated by an extended present within which actors have little scope to realize the ÔgoodÕ life that dominant ideologies continue to construct.
The contemporary relation to time also creates experiences of rupture and loss. Guyer (2009) suggests the near future, previously a horizon of possibility towards which individuals and societies could act, has largely disappeared, replaced by long-term promises of the future prosperity that free-markets or evangelistic religion offer to the faithful. For others, the end of history, neoliberal hegemony and the absence of alternatives to capitalism have hollowed out not just the mid-range future but also the longer-term utopian horizon necessary to motivate belief in a better future (Harvey 2000; Friedmann 2000) .
With different emphases, these accounts engage with concerns that technological, societal and environmental changes, interacting with the neoliberal focus on free markets as the way to determine the future, have reworked time, undermining the scope for purposively shaping futures. Rosa (2003) further suggests that social acceleration fundamentally challenges the possibility of democratic governance since many social transformations now happen so quickly as to defy the ponderous processes required to govern change (democracy takes time). In LuhmannÕs (1976) terms, economic and technological change are creating Ôfuture presentsÕ at a rate that surpasses societal capacity to deliberate about Ôpresent futuresÕ or switch trajectories towards the realization of desirable alternatives.
Contemporary sociological work, drawing on theoretical frameworks focused on complexity, frequently conceptualizes futures as emergent products of complex socio-technical systems that are powerfully path-dependent, generating lock-in effects that are hard to reshape (Urry 2016) .
Presenting change as a product of systemic processes that seem to defy ready steering does not offer much hope for responding to the urgent need for transformation to avoid impending ecological crises. Paradoxically, then, at a time when climate change and associated fears speak to an unprecedented need to plan for a radically different future, there is limited faith that it is possible or desirable to do so on the scale required to transform society. The weak contemporary status of ideas of planning (e.g. Gunder 2016 ) and their association with anachronistic, governmental practices, must therefore be critically assessed in relation to changing ideas of time, with a view to somehow separating political and ideological influences from underlying social changes that potentially challenge the possibility of planning.
Before turning our attention more fully to planningÕs engagement with time. In the next section, we first set out to explore a variety of perspectives that have the potential to generate new insights into the relationship between planning and time.
B. Searching for new times in other disciplines
capacity to steer change or avert future threats to life, justice and prosperity. We now draw selective lessons from some of the ways time has been redefined in physics, biology and philosophy to extend our conceptual understanding of time. We will then draw out the implications of these insights to rethink planning in its relationship to time.
NewtonÕs conception of absolute time as a constant backdrop to all physical events whose duration, pace and progression can be mathematically measured provides the basis for the development of mechanical engineering and underpins clock-time Ðas well as everyday temporal perceptions in western cultures (Adam 1990 ). However, led by EinsteinÕs theory of relativity, twentieth century advancements in physics revolutionized the concept of time, transforming it from an absolute universal linear continuum to a relative characteristic of objects in space. Relative time is observerdependent and non-homogenous, which relates intuitively to certain aspects of the lived experience of time. Subsequent developments in quantum physics have given rise to many counter-intuitive paradoxes where, for example, time can appear ÔimaginaryÕ or even disappear altogether.
If developments in physics problematize any common-sense equation of clock-time with an underlying physical reality, considering biological ideas of time reveals the depth of social alienation from natural rhythms (Grosz 2004; Adam 1990) . By imposing Newtonian clock time, late modern societies deny the biorhythms that underlie our health and well-being, including circadian rhythms, changing seasons and ageing.
BiologistsÕ accounts of time point towards a rich and dynamic understanding of a:
Òworld of orchestrated rhythms of varying speed and intensity, of temporally constituted uniqueness, a realm of organisms with the capacity for memory and foresight and of beings that time their actions and reckon time.Ó (Adam 1990, 72) The dynamic ways in which organisms grow, transform, repair and recycle themselves over the life course and succession of generations indicate that change does not happen in some externally measurable time. Rather, it is constitutive of the varying times of different forms of being and Philosopically, Aristotle conceptualized time as a number of movements (Òarithmos kineseosÓ), a quantified succession related to change in space (movement). Everything that changes is thus ÒinÓ time, and time and change are mutually co-generated. Modern philosophers have, however, considered time as a fundamental, yet still oddly elusive, facet of human consciousness, identity formation and free will. HeideggerÕs ÔdaseinÕ, for example, defines selfhood in terms of an existential temporality where ÒBeing É must be conceived in terms of timeÓ (Heidegger 2010, 222) and Òbeing and time determine each other reciprocallyÓ (Heidegger, 1996, 3) . We project our lives and actions towards our death, thus the term "being-towards-death." This challenges the self to Husserl focused on the way we experience time and the structures of consciousness that enable time perceptions, linking time-consciousness to memory, expectation, imagination, habituation, selfawareness, identity and generally what it means to be oneself (Husserl 1893 (Husserl -1917 (Husserl , 1991 . The starting point of his phenomenology of time-consciousness is that Aristotelian and Newtonian time cannot explain how consciousness experiences continuity or temporal objects. Thus, articulating the experience of lived-time requires a non-Newtonian understanding of time. Husserl proposes that Now is our absolute point of orientation from which things appear as past or future (Husserl 1991) .
Our consciousness of internal time, of the succession of lived experiences in the Now, enables the unification of successive moments, events and emotions and makes our very identity possible (Husserl 1991; Sokolowski 2000) . We form primal impressions which we retain (memory objectifies past events). Consciousness then extends beyond the Now into the past (retention) and future (protention). The relationship between time and meaning is essential here. The subjective meaning of an action is tied to the actorÕs inner (eigen) time, and consists of Òthe act projected as an aim in the stream of consciousnessÓ (Tada 2018,1) . That is, we always act in the future perfect tense, so that we will have achieved something in the future.
Bergson meanwhile connected time, duration and the possibility of free will (Bergson 1889 (Bergson , 2001 ).
Against classical philosophical calls to transcend the temporal, Bergson argues that thinking is not a matter of getting Òoutside of timeÓ but of getting back Òinto durationÓ (Bergson 1934 (Bergson , 1946 ÒintuitiveÓ connection with the processes of becoming that characterize all forms of life (Grosz, 2005) . This has important implications. While Kant (1781 Kant ( , 1998 ) conceptualized free will outside of time, 5 Bergson asserts the possibility of free will within duration. Freedom is the possibilities opened up by connecting with multiple levels of duration. An actorÕs eigen time creates meaning and opens the possibility Ðand obligation-of making choices (Tada 2018) .
Drawing on Bergson, Deleuze proposes a more complex theory of time as a non-measurable manifold of coexisting syntheses (Williams 2011; Deleuze [1968 Deleuze [ ] 1994 . The manifold component refers to a non-chronological concept of time as an n-dimensional and non-measurable series of networked and interacting processes. It is characterized by infinite variability. In this sense, time is not a continuous flow, but a combination of singular, chaotic events. Syntheses are processes through which paths emerge "out of a chaos of unrelated particulars" (Williams 2011, 30) .
This very brief overview of some major themes emerging in physics, biology and the philosophy of time suggests the complexity and centrality of time as both an object of thought and fundamental aspect of life. For present purposes, we do not seek a philosophically rigorous definition of time.
Rather we note key features and developments that we might use when considering ways of rethinking planningÕs relationship to time. These include moves towards an understanding of time that is more biological than mechanical, an emergent property of all forms of life. In this understanding, time is no longer an abstract and empty form, a linear progression or a simple measure, but is instead a complex, relational and plural set of potentialities that enable diverse processes of becoming and differentiation which can be experienced in diverse ways and described using multiple traits: its grain, or the precision of time divisions (Wall Street v. Island time); the period or frequency of recurrence of events (days v. centuries); the amplitude, or degree of change during or between events; the rate or speed of change; the synchronization of cycles and phases; and oneÕs orientation to the past, present and future (Lynch 1972, 76) .
These ideas point towards rich possibilities for re-thinking planning in its relations to time, exploring new ways of understanding and working with and against processes of social acceleration. To consider the implications of these possibilities, we first move on to review existing perspectives on the relations between planning and time.
C. Time quandaries: What do they mean for planning?
In this section of the paper we review prevailing conceptions of time in planning theory before considering important dimensions of planningÕs relationship to the past, present and future. In doing so we seek to establish how the temporal horizons of planning have been understood in existing literature.
The (post-) Modern time horizons of planning theory
In 1993, John Friedmann wrote that planningÕs traditional ÒEuclideanÓ model of time-space geometry had become an anachronism:
ÒThe engineering model of planning (É), with its penchant for advance decision making and blueprinting and its claims of superiority to other forms of decision making because of its scientific character (É) must be abandoned.Ó (Friedmann 1993,482) Assuming a Òcollapse of the space-time continuumÓ (op cit), Friedmann called for a Òpost-Euclidean planningÓ to embrace multiple space-time geographies. In temporal terms, this means planners must get closer to the action, engaging in Òreal timeÓ right ÒnowÒ rather than claiming a dubious capacity to shape an unknowable future.
Identifying ÔmodernÕ planning with a discredited faith in scientific methods and misplaced expectations of control over the future aligns with the broad temporal shifts discussed above, and with wider postmodern critiques of modernist planning (Beauregard 1989) . The post-modern condition reduces trust in the future, progress, and our ability to shape either. Instead, it shifts the socio-political focus towards the present. Distrust in future progress also replaces planningÕs Ògrand plansÓ with incremental risk mitigation, adaptation and resilience. Planning still seeks to normalize and shape the future to support stability, security and certainty but that future is increasingly shortterm (Connell 2009 ).
Cautious of the limits of prescriptive forecasting and of planningÕs capacity to control the future, Friedmann proposed two temporal coordinates for planning: one, a utopian horizon to navigate towards, and the other concerned with immediate, real-time incremental actions in the present (Beauregard 2015) . Arguably, these remain the limiting timescales for much of planning theory today. Few would disagree agree with Beauregard (2015) when he argues that planners should cultivate a creative orientation towards the possible rather than resigning themselves to the probable.
However, prevailing approaches typically stress the immediate complexity and indeterminacy of the world, the likelihood of unexpected outcomes and thus the superiority or necessity of incrementalism and pragmatism. Communicative planning theories focused on learning from practice have, for example, illustrated how planners have no choice but to improvise and muddle through (Hoch 2016; Connell 2009; Lindblom 1959; Laws and Forester 2015) . This promotes a pragmatic focus on deliberation about the here and now as a means of debating change, but arguably pays less attention to how the future is represented or to the impact of such representations (Myers 2007) .
Alternative theoretical approaches drawing on complexity theory ( These accounts of contemporary planning theoryÕs future-orientation do not, however, exhaust the temporal complexities of planning practices that operate within culturally distinctive regulatory regimes which produce their own temporalities and rhythms, typically encompassing multiple relations to past, present and future (Abram 2014) . It is to these that we now turn.
Behind the times: Planning and the past
Time is deeply intertwined with history. Humanity lives ÒhistoricallyÓ, i.e., with awareness of the past and of the presentÕs position relative to the past. According to Nietzsche:
ÒThe historical and the unhistorical are equally necessary for the health of an individual, a people and a culture.Ó (Nietzsche 1874 (Nietzsche ,1980 .
The balance between strong roots (NietzscheÕs historicity) and freedom from the past (NietzcheÕs unhistoricity) should be the core concern of historic preservation, and maybe of planning as a whole.
In the 1500s, Western Europe developed an aesthetic relation to relics and ruins, which mark the flow of time and place the now in a chosen relation to the past. By the 18th century, preservation was an upper-class fashion, and by the 19th century it had diffused to the middle-class and grew into the preservation movement. Today, it is so well ingrained that saving ÒsignificantÓ structures is a generally accepted moral imperative. In addition to romantic tastes, preservation can evoke patriotic feelings and social unity by representing collective histories and trajectories. The choices involved in decisions about remembrance and preservation-worthy past periods or events are value-laden. Since the remote past is less threatening than the recent past (bad memories fade), the recent past tends to be discarded (e.g., 1970s gas stations), until it is remote enough to become ÒvintageÓ (e.g., 1950s gas stations). The inevitable politics of preservation involve a highly-selective construction of pasts that enable particular Òimagined communitiesÓ to control the present and therefore shape the future (e.g., Zukin 2012; Lindgren 1993) . Under capitalism this frequently involves commodifying the past as part of strategies to generate economic returns.
In addition to anchoring us in the grand flow of history, historic preservation makes the implicit promise that a friendly future will also preserve our present. Relations to the past and to a friendly future are important to wellbeing, quality-of-life and property values, e.g., in the well-preserved historic centers of Florence, Paris or San Francisco. However, to the extent that historic preservation seeks to ÔfixÕ certain elements of the built environment in time rather than viewing them as dynamic parts of a fluid and ever-changing system, it may also mark a retreat from the complexities of historical change (Tait and While 2009) .
Conversely, the logic of development leads planners to ignore, problematize or write-off aspects of the past considered unworthy of preservation, such as obsolescent Òdilapidated,Ó "insalubrious" or ÒdatedÓ structures, demolished to facilitate progress towards the new. Cultural attachments to places and their unique histories and meanings can lead people to mobilize resistance against demolitions, generating conservative politics against change and its promises of planned progress. PlanningÕs complicity in processes of creative destruction generates a range of responsibilities towards the past, and towards people who find the loss of valued attachments traumatic (e.g. Erfan 2017 ). This responsibility is rarely acknowledged, except perhaps in belatedly recognizing the historic failings of urban renewal programs (Schweitzer 2015) .
If historic preservation has the potential to link the past, present and possible futures of built environments, planning history plays a similar function in building narratives about the nature of planning as a societal activity. As Sandercock (1998) argues, making visible previously hidden stories that challenge the dominant account of a socially reformist, professional activity populated by white, male heroes and villains has a distinctive political purpose. Reframing histories can lead to the critical reshaping of understandings of contemporary planning and how it should develop in the future.
Now is the Time for change: Timing, urgencies, delays and conflict in the present
Plans and planning decisions are often criticized for taking too long, for getting their timing wrong.
Plans intended to guide developments over a fifteen to twenty year period are often out of date before they are implemented, due to delays in their production, political wrangling, or changes in circumstance that undermine their rationales and aspirations.
However, despite concerns that planning for the future has become impossible or unfashionable, plans continue to be made for various timescales, from longer-term strategic visions to shorter-term, detailed master-plans for particular sites or neighborhoods (Abram 2014) . In response to criticism of inflexible blueprints, planning theory and practice have attempted to imagine more flexible, adaptable and incremental plans. Contemporary ideas of strategic planning, for example, see plans as part of ongoing deliberative processes intended to influence stakeholder actions towards the realization of a shared vision (e.g. Balducci et al. 2011; Throgmorton, 2003) . The persuasive power of such visions to mobilize action across time and space is perhaps less certain (Shipley 2006) , and they are often accompanied by shorter-term action plans and monitoring to ensure they are responsive to changing circumstances.
Concerns and complaints about the impact of decision-making delays on development are common, even though ÔdelayÕ itself is often not clearly defined (Booth 2002) . In many Western nations, plan implementation is primarily measured by the speed of development permit processing (e.g., Ball 2011). These concerns are particularly marked in a neoliberal era when state planning processes are seen as imposing unreasonable restrictions on market-forces, hindering private development and thus economic prosperity. Attempts to limit regulations and speed-up decision-making have been central to neoliberal reform initiatives. The imperative of speed, however, often conflicts with other goals, like ensuring meaningful public participation which requires sensitivity to the time needed to engage diverse publics (Abram 2014; Weber 2015; Raco et al. 2018) .
suggests that widespread concerns about planning delays may be overstated compared to delays due to developer behavior, financing issues or political influence. This draws attention to the multiple temporalities that need to be coordinated to implement development projects, including: bureaucratic and legal processes, electoral terms, political machinations to secure public support, macro and micro-economic, investment and redevelopment cycles. Each operates on distinctive rhythms that require synchronization for development to occur. Timing is therefore a crucial and deeply challenging dimension of planning practice. Disjunctions between activities can, and do, generate conflict and delay. Legal and/or processing agreements can thus be used to try to bind actors to an agreed timeline (Lloyd and Peel 2012) -with the risk that those excluded from such agreements (typically wider publics) will contest their terms.
Failures in the timing of planning processes can have profound effects on people and places.
ÔPlanning blightÕ is a consequence of the uncertainty generated by temporal lags between a publicly On the other hand, time is also used strategically and tactically by a range of actors. The use of pacing and delay by the powerful to wear down resistance is, for example, apparent in opposition to lawsuits launched by workers, residents and environmentalists seeking redress for environmental harms committed by petrochemical plants in Louisiana:
"They (residents of a heavily contaminated bayou) have been kept waiting for years for word on a lawsuit, a wait that has nearly worn them down and spent their anger " (p 43) "... it is common corporate strategy, with the cooperation of the state agencies, to string these lawsuits out for so long that plaintiffs die before money is due." (Hochschild 2016,53-54 Auyero 2012). Pace is also key to private speculation and investment but can be modified by protests or administrative complications. In Mexican Colonias, Òwaiting is employed as a tactic that is often strategic rather than passiveÓ (Lombard 2013, 817 ).
Further, micro-level research is required to explore the complex forms of temporal regulation on which all planning instruments and processes are premised. However, all of these examples point towards distinctive facets of a still rarely considered politics of time that is central to planning, especially when it comes to the pace and timing of development and change. While this politics may be something planning actors are intuitively attuned to, thinking more explicitly about time and temporalities may open up a range of possibilities for thinking and acting differently.
Only time will tell: Planning and the future
If the Òplan operates as a temporal hinge from a secure past to loss in the present, and from a known future to an unknown futureÓ (Abram 2014 p.140) , the future can be understood as that which is Ònot-yetÓ (Adam, 2006) . Planning, investment and development are future-oriented in so far as they seek to normalize the future, reducing risk and uncertainty (Connell 2009 ). Paradoxically, this often involves systematically discounting the future. This discounting is explicit in cost-benefit analyses but also implicit in legal frameworks that hold us responsible for past actions but not for the future consequences of present decisions. As a result, the Òcommodified empty futureÓ is exploited in the interest of the present (Adam and Groves 2011, 18) .
ÒIndustrial extension into the future is characterized by parasitical borrowing from the future, by prospecting and plundering it for use and benefit in the present without regard for timespace distantiated effectsÉÓ (Adam 2006, 125) .
This puts the future at risk, a risk often raised by environmental activists, because:
Òin industrial societies today the present is transcended and the future as last frontier (is) colonized with enduring things, belief systems and institutions, with cultural and technological products, with insurance and economic practices. As such, the future is pursued, prospected, produced and pollutedÓ (Adam 2006, 125) .
Driven by concerns about the pollution of the future and doubts about the ability to move social practices onto sustainable pathways, futures have recently re-emerged as a key concern across the social sciences (e.g. Poli 2014). However, social science research methods are often inadequately equipped to understand and shape futures, because they focus on existing (past or present) empirical facts (Adam 2006) . In contrast, planners necessarily must rely on forecasts and projections, whether of future economic growth, demographic change or household formation rates. Policy-makers and politicians sometimes seek certainty or political protection in such seemingly ÔfactualÕ quantification.
Others worry that the dominance of probabilistic approaches has undermined more imaginative and creative engagement with possible and preferred futures (Isserman 1985) . Alternative approaches might incorporate design-based knowledge or understand how plans tell Òpersuasive stories about the future,Ó engaging and influencing stakeholders (Throgmorton 2003) . Much of planning practice, however, remains technocratically wedded to the logics of probabilistic forecasting.
Significantly, the planning literature on futures rarely recognizes that engaging people with the future poses particular challenges in societies where the Òcapacity to aspireÓ is not universal or evenly distributed (Appadurai 2013 ). Individuals and communities have different orientations towards the future and the possibility of planning. Planning also largely fails to engage with the complex psychosocial or affective dimensions of engaging with the future, which often involves collective negotiation of the past in order to build understanding and hope in the present (Baum 1997; Erfan 2017 ).
Futures Studies, emerging from corporate and governmental exercises in foresight, emphasize that the future is socially constructed and that exploring possible, probable and preferred futures facilitates anticipatory action (Bell 1997 
D. Discussion: ItÕs Time for New Planning Terms and Propositions
This paper started from the premise that late capitalist societies have an increasingly troubled relationship to time. We described how intensifying space-time compression characterizes modernity, how clock-time came to be internalized as natural rather than a socially constructed form of temporal discipline, and how modernity opened up the future. We also discussed how the postmodern condition and social acceleration pose challenges for our sense of time, especially by undermining the future as an open horizon that can be purposively shaped and reducing the present as a Ôswitching pointÕ from which new historical trajectories might be initiated.
Here, we suggest how planning might become more attuned and sensitive to multiple temporalities.
Drawing on the ideas introduced above, we present eight propositions for re-articulating planningÕs relationship to time and how we experience time in urban life. In the physical domain, they are mainly oriented towards streets and public spaces that provide communities a sense of place and time (Degen 2018), acting as ÒtimescapesÓ (Adam 1998) and Òcommunal registersÓ (Hebbert 2005) . They are also aimed at planning processes, deceleration, potential resistance, and opening up possibilities for multiple temporalities to coexist. By encompassing many dimensions of time, they illustrate the potential for an explicit focus on planningÕs temporal dimensions to develop a rich range of possibilities for practice at various levels of granularity, period and amplitude; encompassing multiple time-horizons, rates or tempos, degrees of synchronization, regularity, dominant orientations (to the past, present or future), and various time-budgets -from excesses to shortages of time (Lynch 1972; Eshuis and van Buuren 2014) .
Developing a sense-of-now through now-making strategies
When envisioning new ways for planning to apprehend time and temporalities, we need a few new time-related terms. A place is a specific point in a generic, undefined space. Placelessness, lack of sense of place, is detrimental to well-being because humans need a sense of place (we dwell in place, not in space). Thus, place-making, or creating a sense of place, focuses on the uniqueness of places. Thus, we refer (in perhaps ungainly terms) to efforts to put a place, event, city or person in a unique and identifiable now or moment in time as Ònow-making.Ó Alongside the more familiar vocabulary of place-making, we suggest planning needs to support sense-of-now and address nowlessness by developing now-making strategies. The challenge becomes to facilitate the answer to the question ÒWhat time is this place?Ó (Lynch 1972) . This temporal orientation might be reimagined as a core aspiration for planning. Adopting a pragmatic or Meadian understanding of human action and understanding planning as bringing knowledge to action, the Now of the present Òinvolves bringing the future into the act, and reconstructing the past in terms of the presentÓ (Strauss 1991,419) . The future emerges out of the present, conditioned by the past but remains nonetheless an emplaced moment of possibility and choice.
Practically, how do we show present choices and emerging futures in the Now? Whilst World Fairs can be seen as spectacles commodifying the future and manipulating audiences into accepting an imposed future (Benjamin, 1970) , they are also examples of now-making events in so far as they 
Now-management for coping with changing times
PlanningÕs relation to time also requires thinking about change, rates of change and inflection points.
Change is unavoidable, marks time, and entails risks. Resilience lies in preparing for and coping with change, not searching for an impossible state of equilibrium. Planning thus has a responsibility to prepare, orient and care for possible changes and their myriad effects on people and places. Given the exploitation and spoiling of the future, we need to be guided by an ethics of care for our common fate, by the need to tend to interdependencies and to the future, i.e., a focus on the ÒtimeprintsÓ (in addition to footprints) of our actions (Adam and Groves 2011) . We also need to respond to urgent demands to explore transitions and pathways that may take us towards a more sustainable future.
Change operates on multiple levels, including growth and decay, spatial redistribution and migration, variations in intensity, disturbance and restoration cycles and longer-term climatic changes. We also need to manage entropy and obsolescence, and limit how much waste the future will inherit (Nowotny 1996) . All changes have economic, environmental, social and psychological costs and can stimulate fear, regret and loss (Marris 2016).
Change is easiest when it responds to intentional and announced plans, and where conflicts are clarified, if not resolved. Change is difficult when it responds to external shocks or disasters. It is even more difficult when change is an effort to transition away from abandonment (waste, derelict buildings, neighborhoods and lands) and in situations of conflict (in the absence of consultation and trust, in climates of unfair processes and outcomes).
Planners frequently express frustration when they encounter opposition to change and development that they view as urgent or necessary. An improved relation to time might, however, prepare both planners and the publics they encounter to understand and cope with change. The considerations above lead us to consider Ònow managementÓ (in addition to space management) as a new rationale for planning. Time and change are (and should be) evident in the social and physical world. In particular, our urban environments could (and should) not seek to reflect an impossible permanence or an artificially stable, reconstructed history, but instead teach us about change. They should seek to ease change by making it transparent, announced, and piecemeal. Does ConnollyÕs idea of Òdwelling-in-durationÓ offer a position from which to plan whilst accounting for the multiple forms of becoming that shape cities and lives? How can we learn not just to dwell in duration, but also prepare our collective becoming for the future? How to avoid doomed efforts to control or micromanage the future, and instead facilitate intentional change and adaptive steering in the direction of (normatively defined) desired futures? And how do we do this in realities marked by conflict and profound power inequalities?
Taking the time to plan, improvising and challenging acceleration
Faced with both the neoliberal refrain that planning takes too long and the argument that social acceleration undermines thoughtful democratic governance, we must explore the possibilities and consequences of taking the time to plan. This includes exploring how new technologies accelerate planning and urban governance processes. However, it also entails making the case for the selective acceleration or deceleration of some forms of urban change, finding ways to stimulate deliberation and debate in response to the multiple temporalities affected by the development of cities.
Accounting for the embodied energy and lifetime resource use of new building, for example, may reconfigure our understanding of good urban development, reshape thinking about investment, development and growth. Challenging conceptions of urban development ÔcyclesÕ as somehow ÒnaturallyÓ occurring temporal rhythms that must be accommodated to may meanwhile open up new possibilities for intervention (Weber 2015) .
By encouraging practices of Òdwelling in durationÓ as advocated by Connolly, it may become possible to make time for a form of planning that explores the multiple temporalities, synchronicities and asynchronicities involved in urban change and their short, medium and longer-term consequences. For instance, planning processes could consider not only the goals and objectives of multiple stakeholders, but also the timeframes they envision or expect, i.e., when the costs and benefits of changes may accrue. Extending the call for Òslow citiesÓ and Òslow buildingÓ (Weber, 2015) , Òslow planningÓ can be a selective tactic for accommodating multiple temporalities and concerns, tempering the negative impacts of urban development processes dominated by financial rates of returns or the preferred pacing of dominant actors (Raco et al. 2018) . 
ÔMaking timeÕ through surprises in urban space
Due to complex bio-neurological mechanisms, humans are subject to temporal distortions when time is perceived to slow down, speed up, stop or run backwards. 7 Features of space and experiences affect time perceptions in ways that are highly relevant to planning. For example, we overestimate shorter intervals and underestimate longer intervals (Fortin and Rousseau 1998) . We recall recent events as more distant in time and distant events as more recent. Motivation decreases, and interruptions increase, perceived durations. Separation between stimuli affects perceived durations, e.g., a trip covering a long distance appears to take longer than a shorter trip of the same duration (Sarrazin et al. 2004 ). These distortions can be used or corrected to modify perceived distances and durations. For instance, short blocks, landmarks in the distance (as opposed to the New York Òcanyon effectÓ), Òtime to destinationÓ signs (e.g., Ò6-minute walk to City HallÓ or Ò5 blocks to City
High SchoolÓ) and signage about near-future events (e.g., Ò4 minutes until the next bus,Ó Ò3 more days until SpringÓ) can reduce perceived distances and durations. The ÒSociety for the slowing down of timeÓ (Verein zur verzšgerung der Zeit) and the Slow Movement take a different approach:
they encourage people to slow down, bracket clock time and its false urgencies, to enjoy the ÒflowÓ of pleasurable activities. Social events that can slow down or stop time include music, myths and rituals, which Levi-Strauss called Òmachines for the suppression of timeÓ (1964 ( , 276 in Thrift 1977 .
Perhaps most importantly, ÒoddballÓ unexpected stimuli (experiencing awe, surprises, changes, disruptions) Òslow downÓ perceived time. Deceleration increases our focus and gives us the sense of having more time (Aaen-Stockdale et al. 2011 ). This oddball effect slows time during stress-induced fight-or-flight responses, but also, and more positively, when we dedicate all our attention to what we do or to making sense of the world around us. Adult minds rarely step outside physical and mental routines and our brains, adapted to repeated stimuli, disengage from the present moment.
Thus, adult time Òflies.Ó Calls for reconnecting to our Òinner childÓ seek to exploit the link between happiness and being Òin the flowÓ, i.e., completely absorbed in the task at hand (Csikszentmihalyi 2002) . With new stimuli, awe and surprise ÒoddballÓ events, cities might therefore decelerate time.
Unexpected events can make time slow down, anchoring us Òin the now.Ó This is something mindfulness meditation practitioners, fl‰neurs and flash mob participants, build on. For instance, the New York based ÒImprov EverywhereÓ group organized a time-travel subway prank where sets of twins staged arguments between a man and his future self (enacted by his twin) about the merit of building a time machine. A surprise pizza delivery to a random subway car, reenactments of scenes from the Matrix and a car-alarm symphony in a mall parking lot are examples of memorable events that audiences of commuters and shoppers probably experienced as surprising events, anchoring them deeply in the Now that day. Planners too could seek to make the urban landscape surprising rather than aim for predictability.
Opening ÔprogressiveÕ futures in the here and Now
Heidegger (1996, 2010) locates the possibility of free will in the Now whilst also emphasizing the future-orientation of Dasein, a "being-thereÓ that is active in the world through projections and projects. In this sense, both Bergson and Heidegger think of the present as a moment of freedom (Òthe only resemblance between Bergson and Heidegger --and it is a considerable one-lies here:
both base the specificity of time on a conception of the openÓ [Deleuze 1986 in Massey 2015 ).
As Dasein gives ontological basis to the future, it also opens the possibility-and existentialists would add the responsibility-of choice and free will. As we anticipate and project towards the future, what comes out of the future is our past (our ÒbaggageÓ) embodied in our "having-been-ness" We might also consider how to mark time and change in space. Artifacts and events can make time stand still. With historic preservation and monuments, we slow down urban change while informing the future in the present. In this perspective, historic preservation should not become Òheritage brandingÓ (Hetherington 2013) , seek to capitalize on the rhythms of a place, or profit from a local experience economy (Degen 2018). Instead, planning for historic structures should seek to retain elements of the past that place us and the Now in the flow of time, recognizing that: ÒWe preserve present signals of the past or control the present to satisfy our image of the futureÓ (Lynch 1972 p.65). We preserve some structures deemed Òhistoric,Ó whilst demolishing others. Sometimes we preserve whole districts to create a grand illusion of the past remaining alive (downtown Tombstone). Sometimes we collage historic and futuristic structures (e.g., the Royal Ontario Museum with its glass shard emerging from the historic building). As they mark the flow of time, cities and urban activities should also support a variety of body times.
We cannot all be expected to rise at 6am, commute at 7:30am, leave work at 6pm, eat at 7pm, sleep at 11pm. Babies, teenagers, adults and the elderly have different wake/sleep cycles. This also raises questions of urban services. What do cities have to offer teenagers when they emerge in late summertime evenings? Where can the elderly go for a healthy breakfast at 5am on a Tuesday?
Viewed like this, time can be understood in its equity dimension, enabling access to time, and ensuring that the burdens of temporal dysfunctions do not fall disproportionately on certain people (e.g., single working parents who need to navigate public transit during peak commuting hours or need access to formal services outside working hours). Italian experiments in Ôtime planningÕ are instructive here, involving the production of Òtime plans,Ó investigation of how diverse temporal needs and dysfunctions affect urban life, and proposing ways of realigning activities in time to enable more equitable or innovative use of time and space (Belloni 1998) 8 .
Cities should also support our preoccupations with actual time and biorhythms and provide Òtemporal cuesÓ of circadian socio-ecological times, near future time and long-term evolutionary time (Thrift 1977, 83) . Clocks on city walls allow the coordination of activities and provide the allimportant answer to daily concerns about the time. Urban design features could also support biological clocks with displays of time that synch us to natural cycles, and make change visible, e.g., marking sunrise, sunset, tides and seasons on modified clocks, or with festivals, seasonal lights, fireworks. At the streetscape scale, planting deciduous trees rather than evergreens reveals the passing of seasons, and experiencing Fall and Spring gets us ready for harsh winters and summers.
The aesthetics of passing time are perhaps best captured by water courses, and riverfront promenades are often favorite city walks (Portland, San Antonio, Savannah). At the building scale, choosing reflective facades or sandstone that turns pink in the sunrise and sunset can confirm biorhythms and indicate that the day is starting or ending.
Now-making and placemaking: Embodying time and identity in space
Now-making implies that users of a specific place have a sense of now. To support this, clocks could be designed not only to display clock time and biological rhythms, but also Òshadow timesÓ, e.g., geological times. A local sense of now is also one that places the current moment (now) in the perspective of broader local cultures, stories and histories.
Mikhail BakhtinÕs (1981) concept of ÒchronotopesÓ illustrates the idea that space can be used to give form to time. Chronotopes are:
Òpoints in geography of a community where time and space intersect and fuse. Time takes on flesh and becomes visibleÉ likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements of time and historyÉ chronotopes thus stand as monuments to the community itselfÓ (Bakhtin 1981 , 7 cited in Basso 1996 help anchor their present in history, opening the possibility of different futures. In less dramatic circumstances, community planning processes that aim to Òhelp a community experience itself in timeÓ (Baum 1999, 10) should also aim to excavate understandings of the past in order to effectively link the present to possible futures (Erfan 2017) asking what made us who we are? When and where?
Where do we go next?
Making time for inclusive temporalities
Urban forms and activities should support a variety of cultural temporalities and be attentive to the Planning that is sensitive to multiple temporalities and varied senses-of-time must understand cities as Òpolyrhythmic ensemblesÓ (Degen 2017, 145) . The human experience of change and choice comprises a mosaic of temporalities, consisting of each actorÕs own temporality, his/her eigen time (Tada 2018) , of collective social times, and of natural times (Tabboni 2001) . Dates are charged with different meanings for different people: time marked by the traces, persistence and legacies of past events; generational time through which societies evolve, and; time mediated through narratives about the evolution and change of society and self (Browne 2014) . These multiple temporalities vary across communities and individuals, operate at different speeds and rhythms, and coexist and collide daily in cities (Crang 2001).
Planning should support these multiple rhythms and temporalities in sensory and temporal urban practices, with a special attention to the temporalities of the least advantaged. Urbanism, architecture and signs can materialize in space the passing of time as well as diverse histories, memories and experiences. To guide this effort, Lefebvre (2004) calls for Òrhythm-analysesÓ to identify the activities that punctuate urban life and give residents a sense of time and place. This entails asking:
Who is using what space? When? and How? At the core of these rhythms are the circadian (daily but variable) rhythms which form urban timescapes (Bates 2006; Adam 1990 
Conclusion: ItÕs a matter of time
As we have seen, time is a constituent dimension of change, memory, identity, meaning, organization, free will, choice, and protention towards goals. It is Òthe attribution of meaning to changeÉ and its organization in terms of goals and other affirmation of values. É a uniquely social way of pronouncing on Ôthe meaning of lifeÕÓ (Tabboni 2001, 9) . Thus, planning only exists in time, and time opens up the possibility of planning.
Given that planning is such a richly temporal activity, fundamentally concerned with change, timing and the possibilities of controlling space through time, it is striking that planning theory has yet to engage in any substantive way with the implications of contemporary concerns about social acceleration. Planning activity has in general not developed an explicit discourse about how to develop a repertoire of consciously-temporal practices.
In this paper we have reviewed the implications for planning theory of a range of contemporary In doing so we identified possibilities for rethinking how planning relates to time, and how paying attention to multiple temporalities might shape debate about the possibilities and conditions for planned change: planning, we have argued, is a richly temporal practice which has not-yet fully explored the possibilities that could be opened up by adopting explicitly temporal ways of knowing and acting. To illustrate this we have explored how planning might address urban ÒnowlessnessÓ and support a strong and inclusive sense of time, particularly a Òsense of now.Ó From this perspective, planningÕs temporalities encompass not just political, administrative and economic times but also calendar and clock times, socio-cultural times, narrative times, times of historical legacies and traces, generational times, individual psychological and biological times, natural and geological times. We have discussed how planning might draw on these resources, strengthening local senses of time through a variety of Ònow-makingÓ strategies that seek to make a mosaic of temporalities visible and explicit in the built environment, in planning narratives and in planning processes (e.g., making urban landscapes surprising rather than predictable). We believe that these propositions should be as integral to planning as place-making.
We hope this paper will help planning theorists do better justice to the many times and temporalities of practice, and that it will initiate further, rich discussion, amongst theorists, educators and practitioners, about the importance of reflecting on time and the forces underlying and enabling all emergence and becoming. By highlighting the multiplicity of temporalities and rhythms that underpin social life and the production of uneven social relations to the past, present and future, we have opened up a still seldom considered agenda for researching the role and purpose of planning as a form of temporal governance that must find its place in time. With these thoughts and propositions, we also therefore hope to stimulate future plannersÕ imagination with regards to the multiple ways in which a mosaic of temporalities could reshape planning practice.
